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PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS IN
NEGOTIATION
NANCY A. WELSH*

1. INTRODUCTION

Often, when people negotiate, their goal is to win. At the very least,
people work to achieve outcomes (or allocations of value) that they can call
fair, and particularly "fair enough to me!" We all know people (including
ourselves) who have offered more than was necessary in negotiation sessions
or rejected offers even though they made economic sense. These behaviors,
which have been replicated by researchers in experiments involving
"ultimatum games,"' seem irrational but can be explained by examining
fairness perceptions. Negotiators rely upon their perceptions of distributive
and procedural fairness in making offers and demands, reacting to the offers
and demands of others, and deciding whether to reach an agreement or end
negotiations. Because fairness perceptions are so significant in understanding
. Associate Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University.
J.D. Harvard Law School; B.A., magna cum laude, Allegheny College. The author is grateful to
Christopher Honeyman, Janice Nadler, Kevin Gibson, Marcia Caton Campbell, and David Sally for
their comments on a previous draft.
1.In these games, Player 1 is given a fixed sum of money and instructed to divide the money in
any way he chooses with Player 2. If Player 2 accepts the offer, both players will receive their
designated allocations. If Player 2 rejects the offer, neither player will receive anything. Economic
models indicate that Player 1 should offer only slightly more than zero to Player 2, and Player 2
should accept this amount as an improvement on his status quo. Instead, Player I generally offers
30-50% of the sum to Player 2. Twenty percent of those playing Player 2, meanwhile, reject
profitable offers to take zero instead. See Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of
FairnessConsiderationsand Relationships in a Judgmental Perspectiveof Negotiation, in BARRIERS

TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 90-91 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995). Some commentators argue that
negotiators are motivated less by a desire to be fair than by self-interest or a strong aversion to being
disadvantaged themselves. Madan M. Pilluta & J. Keith Murnighan, Fairness in B gaining, 16
SOC. JUST. RESEARCH 241 (2003) (arguing, based on a review of empirical research, that
negotiators' behaviors that produce fair results are motivated less by a commitment to fairness than
by self-interest and considerations of social utility); see E. Fehr & S. Gachter, Altruistic Punishment
in Humans, 415 NATURE 137 (2002); Andrew Oswald & Daniel Zizzo, Are People Willing to Pay to
Reduce Others' Incomes?, ANNALES D'ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE, July/December 2001, at 39.

Apparently, the aversion to being disadvantaged (or "envy principle") affects other animal species as
well. See Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B.M. de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425 NATURE 297
(2003) (reporting that high percentages of capuchin monkeys rejected the opportunity to trade rocks
for cucumber slices when they saw other monkeys receiving grapes-which were perceived as more
desirable-either in exchange for their rocks or without being required to exchange anything).
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people's negotiating behaviors, this essay will examine briefly the criteria that
people use to judge fairness-both distributive and procedural-and the
variables that influence people's perceptions of fairness.
II. DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS

The concept of distributive fairness focuses on the criteria that lead people
to feel that they have received their fair share of available benefits-i.e., that
the outcome of a negotiation or other decision making process is fair.2 People
often disagree, however, regarding the criteria that should be applied in order
to determine whether an outcome is fair. As is obvious from reading judicial
opinions in appellate cases, even impartial and educated people can review the
identical record and reach widely disparate yet equally principled conclusions
regarding what constitutes a fair outcome. The definition of distributive
fairness is, therefore, inevitably subjective. This realization leads to the
following questions: What criteria do people-including negotiators-use to
guide their judgments regarding distributive fairness? What variables
influence people's selection among different criteria, and why do people find
it difficult to reach agreement even when they share a commitment to
achieving an equitable outcome?
A. Competing Criteriafor JudgingDistributiveFairness
The various criteria for judging outcomes' fairness can be distilled into
four basic, competing principles or rules-equality, need, generosity, and
equity. 3 The equalityprinciple provides that everyone in a group should share
its benefits equally. According to the need principle, "those who need more
of a benefit should get more than those who need it less."4 The generosity
principle decrees that one person's outcome should not exceed the outcomes
achieved by others.5 Finally, the equity principle ties the distribution of
benefits to people's relative contribution. Those who have contributed more
should receive more than those who have contributed less. The closer that the
actual outcome of a negotiation is to the outcome a negotiator anticipated
2. See Morton Deutsch, Justice and Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 41
(Morton Deutsch & Peter Coleman eds., 2000).
3. See id.at 42 (describing the equality, need, and equity principles); Karen A. Hegtvedt &
Karen S. Cook, Distributive Justice: Recent Theoretical Developments and Applications, in
HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW

95-96 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001)

(describing the equality, need, and equity principles); Kwok Leung & Michael W. Morris, Justice
Through the Lens of Culture and Ethnicity, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW, supra, at
352.
4. Deutsch, supra note 2, at 42.
5. See Leung & Morris, supra note 3, at 352.
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based on the application of one of these principles, the greater the likelihood
that the negotiator will perceive the outcome as fair.6
Imagine the application of the four principles described supra to a
negotiation between two individuals who are establishing a joint venture and
negotiating the distribution of income. The first negotiator, who has little
capital, is contributing the idea and the time and energy to implement the idea.
The other negotiator is supplying the needed funds for the development and
marketing of the idea. If these individuals are guided by the equality
principle, they will distribute the income from the joint venture equally. If
they use the need principle, the poorer negotiator who is contributing "sweat
equity" will receive a greater share of the income. Under the generosity
principle, neither negotiator would want his income to exceed the income of
the other. Last, and perhaps most difficult, is the application of the equity
principle. Both contributions are needed. Whose is more valuable? The
negotiators' assessments regarding the relative value of their contributions are
likely to be affected by many factors that this essay will examine in more
detail in Part II.C.
B. Variables Affecting Negotiators' Selection Among Competing Fair
Allocation Principles
Research has shown that several variables influence negotiators'
selections 7 among the various fair allocation principles that could apply to a
particular negotiation.
These variables include self-interest, social
relationships, and the interaction between cultural norms and situational
needs.

6. See E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF
TRIALS, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 59 (1989)

(noting that litigants perceived procedures to be more fair and were more satisfied with their
outcomes and with the courts when their outcomes exceeded their subjective expectations);
Bazerman & Neale, supra note 1,at 90 ("[O]ptimal decision making requires consideration of the
expectations and standards of the other parties with whom one is transacting business."); Chris
Guthrie & James Levin, A "Party Sati.facrian" Perpective on a Co prehensive iviediaiion Statute,
13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISp. RESOL. 885, 888-89 (1998) (describing the impact of parties' expectations
upon their satisfaction with the mediation process); Roselle L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication
in Small Claims Court: The Effects of Processand Case Characteristics,29 LAW & SOC. REV. 323,
346-47 (1995) (reporting that disputants' satisfaction with outcomes was influenced primarily by
outcome measures and to a lesser but significant degree, by process evaluations; noting that these
results are "consistent with theories that maintain that outcome satisfaction is influenced more by
one's assessment of the outcome compared with expectations or with others' outcomes than by the
absolute outcome received").
7. This suggests some consciousness of choice. In fact, negotiators may be blissfully unaware
that they are making a choice among various potential criteria.
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1. The Influence of Self-Interest and Relationships Between Negotiators
If no relationship exists between negotiators, self-interest will guide their
choice of the appropriate allocation principle to use in negotiation. A
negotiator who does not expect future interactions with the other person will
use whatever principle-need, generosity, equality, or equity-produces the
better result for her.8 When a negotiator has a negative relationship with the
other person, she will aim to gain more than the other negotiator, even if this
requires undertaking a risky strategy. 9 She certainly will not worry about
achieving an outcome that is fair for that other, despised negotiator. Thus,
"[n]egative affect' within the context of potential relationships can remove
fairness barriers."'
On the other hand, the existence of a positive relationship with another
negotiator makes the attainment of a fair outcome relevant. Further, positive
social relationships influence negotiators' selection of the particular fair
allocation principle that will anchor their negotiations. If a negotiator is
dividing a resource with someone else and expects future, positive
interactions with that person, the negotiator tends to use the equality principle
to define distributive fairness." Those people with some of the strongest
attachments-e.g., romantically involved negotiators-have lower aspirations
and reach less Pareto-efficient outcomes than negotiators who are friends.
The romantically involved negotiators place primary value upon the
continuation of their relationship. In contrast, negotiators who are friends or
colleagues often benefit from the combination of a long-term relationship and
high individual aspirations. 1 2 Relationships obviously matter in negotiators'
definitions of fair outcomes.
2. The Influence of Situational Needs and Cultural Norms
As commerce has become increasingly global, cross-cultural negotiation
has also become more commonplace. Some cultures are known for placing
greater emphasis upon maintaining social relationships than attaining
individual objectives. Many believe, therefore, that the cultural dimension of
collectivism-individualism should have great salience in the negotiation
context. Simply, "individualism refers to a tendency to put a stronger
emphasis on one's personal interest and goals, whereas collectivism refers to a

8. See Bazerman & Neale, supra note 1, at 97.
9. See id at 98-100.
10. Id. at99.
11. See id. at 97; RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTATION THEORY AND STRATEGY, 211-12 (2002).
12. See Bazerman & Neale, supra note 1, at 104-06.
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'3
stronger emphasis on the interests and goals of one's in-group members."'
Collectivist negotiators ought to be more likely than individualists to choose
harmony-enhancing principles for the distribution of benefits (e.g., equality,
need, or generosity principles).
Research indicates, however, that negotiators' choices among the various
allocation principles are not so predictable. First, and consistent with the
importance of relationships noted above, it is only when collectivists are
negotiating with other in-group members that they are more likely to use a
harmony-enhancing principle. If they are not closely related to the other
negotiators, collectivists behave like individualists and tie fair allocation to
contribution, thus leading to their use of the equitable principle. Second,
collectivists' choice among allocation principles depends upon the extent to
which they anticipate receiving some portion of the benefits being allocated.
If a collectivist will not be a recipient (e.g., a supervisor allocating rewards to
employees), the collectivist is less likely to be concerned about fostering
harmony and more likely to use the equitable principle that will enhance value
creation (e.g., productivity). Last, negotiators in collectivist cultures will be
influenced by situational needs.
As previously noted, the supervisor
managing a work group in a collectivist culture is likely to make allocations
that will enhance productivity rather than harmony. Collectivist negotiators
who are acutely aware of resource scarcity may choose to allocate resources
based on the need principle, in recognition of the greater interest in ensuring
basic survival rather than harmony. 14 Though culture is certainly relevant to
negotiators' definitions of distributive fairness, its5 impact depends very much
on the context within which a negotiation occurs.'

C. VariablesAffecting Negotiators'Applicationof the Equitable Principle
Even if negotiators share a preference for use of the same principle,
particularly the equitable principle, they are likely to find it difficult to agree
upon precise terms. 16
Self-interest, negative relationships between
13. Leung & Morris, supra note 3, at 348.
14. See id. at 355.
15. See generally Jayne Seminare Docherty, Culture and Negotiation: Symmetrical
Anthropologyfor Negotiators, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 711 (2004).
16. The frequency and depth of this difficulty may help to explain the criticism that Roger
Fisher and Bill Ury received regarding their assertion that negotiators could and should reach
agreement upon the "objective criteria" to enable a!principled, negotiated outcome. See James J.
White, The Pros and Cons of "Getting to Yes," 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 115, 116 (1984) ("Chapter 5,
entitled 'Insist on Objective Criteria,' is a particularly naive misperception or rejection of the guts of
distributive negotiation."); Roger Fisher, Comment, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 120, 122 (1984) ("Two
judges ... will typically advance law, precedent, and evidence not simply as rationalizations for
positions adopted for other reasons, but honestly, as providing a fair basis for decision.").

MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW

[87:753

negotiators, and the dynamics of the negotiation interaction itself can help to
explain why some negotiators find it easier to agree upon the definition of an
equitable solution than others.
1. The Influence of Self-Interest
Even when negotiators express a desire to be fair and to allocate resources
in a manner that is equitable, their definitions of "equitable outcomes" are
almost inevitably affected by self-interest or an "egocentric bias. 17 People
value their own contributions much more highly than they value the identical
contributions of others. In one research project, for example, when people
were asked to determine what amount should be paid for accomplishing a
particular task, they expected to be paid substantially more for their own work
than they were willing to pay to someone else. 18
Another interesting study simulated the impact of the egocentric bias in
the litigation context. 19 The subjects in the research project learned all the
facts involved in a personal injury accident in which a motorcyclist was hit by
a car and injured. They then determined what they thought would be a fair
settlement to compensate the motorcyclist for his injuries. After this, the
researchers assigned the subjects to play the role of either the motorcyclist or
the driver of the car and to negotiate a settlement. Settlements were reached
in nearly every case. The researchers then worked with another set of subjects
but, this time, began by assigning them to the roles of the motorcyclist and the
driver. While playing their roles, the subjects learned the facts, calculated a
"fair" settlement, and tried to negotiate a settlement. These subjects had a
very difficult time reaching a settlement. Their perceptions of fairness were
affected by the roles they were playing. The motorcyclists' pre-negotiation
judgments of a fair settlement generally involved a large damage award, while
the drivers were much more likely to assess a small damage award. Not
coincidentally, these assessments worked to their own favor. The further
apart the prenegotiation judgments regarding
fair outcomes, the more likely
20
the negotiations were to end in impasse.
Equitable distribution, it seems, is in the eyes of the self-interested
beholder.

17. See Linda Babcock et al., BiasedJudgment of Fairness in Bargaining,85 AM. ECON. REV.
1337 (1995); see also Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in Conflict Resolution
and How to Overcome Them, in HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 219

(summarizing research regarding egocentric judgment).
18. See Thompson & Nadler, supra note 17, at 224-25.
19. See id. at 225.
20. Id.
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2. The Influence of Negative Relationships
The perceived equitable fairness of an outcome is also influenced by who
offers it. A solution that appears fair-even attractive--often loses its luster
once the other negotiator puts it on the table. Several cognitive and
psychological processes may explain this effect, which has been labeled
"reactive devaluation."
These range from the perfectly rational tendency for negotiators to
view an adversary's willingness to offer rather than withhold a given
concession as informative of that concession's value, to the
motivational bias that frequently makes people devalue whatever is at
hand or readily available relative to whatever is unavailable or
withheld.2'
When negotiators are adversaries or have a negative relationship,
however, they are likely to view each other's offers with even greater
suspicion. Indeed, research has demonstrated that while people will react
positively to a solution when it is proposed by someone they view as an ally
or neutral, they will reject precisely the same solution as insufficient when it
is suggested by their adversary. 22 In negotiation, the messenger is very much
a part of the message.
3. The Influence of the Negotiation Interaction
A significant body of research has also found that people's perceptions of
outcome fairness are influenced by how they felt they were treated during a
dispute resolution or decision making process. 23 If they perceived themselves
as treated in a procedurally fair manner, they are more likely to judge the
outcome of that process as fair. Most of this research focuses on the manner
in which a third-party decision-maker treats the disputants, but more recent
research indicates that in consensual processes such as mediation and
negotiation, the disputants are also influenced by their interactions with each
other. 24 This research suggests that negotiators' perceptions of sufficiently
21. Robert M. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction to BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION,
supra note 1, at 15.
22. See id. at 15; Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 1, at 29, 41-42.
23. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
24. See Tina Nabatchi & Lisa Bingham, Expanding Our Models of Justice in Dispute
Resolution: A Field Test of the Contribution of Interactional Justice (June 9-12, 2002) (paper
presented at conference of the International Association for Conflict Management) (finding that
disputants' satisfaction with mediation in the REDRESS program was best explained by their
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equitable arrangements will be influenced by how they were treated during
the negotiation process. If a negotiator perceives that the other negotiator
gave her sufficient opportunity to speak, tried to be open-minded in
considering what she had to say, and treated her with respect, she is more
likely to view the outcome of the negotiation as fair. These interactional
elements-which signal procedural fairness-will be examined in greater
detail in Part III.
4. The Influence of Contextual Distributive Justice Norms
Thus far, this essay has focused on social and psychological variables that
influence negotiators' perceptions regarding equitable distributions. There are
also rational variables that can mitigate the influence of social and
psychological factors. For example, within the legal context, experienced
lawyers' susceptibility to the egocentric bias is likely to be tempered by their
knowledge of the applicable law and legal standards. These lawyers'
negotiations are and should be conducted within the "shadow of the law. 25
Experienced lawyers also possess the knowledge to apply a rational, expected
financial value analysis to determine whether a proposed settlement is
sufficiently consistent with the trial and settlement outcomes in similar
cases. 2 6 Clients can turn to these sophisticated agents 27 to gain outcomes that
are more likely to be consistent with the equitable norms that apply within the
legal context and, at the very least, are no worse than those received by other
similarly-situated litigants. 28 At the same time, lawyers are not immune from
perceptions of their interactions with each other-and particularly receiving "consideration and
dignified, respectful treatment" from each other).
25. See Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 959-66, 968 (1979) (discussing how the "shadow of the law" affects
the negotiation of disputes).
26. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics and Settlement: A New Look at
the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REv. 77, 122 (1997). But see generally Richard Birke & Craig R
Fox, PsychologicalPrinciples in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (1999)
(discussing the considerations that influence attomeys' settlement decisions); Jeffrey M. Singer &
Christopher Honeyman, Cracking the Hard-BoiledStudent: Some Ways to Turn Research Findings
into Effective Training Exercises, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION PRACTITIONER: A MONOGRAM
BRIDGING THEORY AND PRACTICE 190 (Shinji Morokuma ed., 2001).
27. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN
DEALS AND DISPUTES 93-96 (2000) (describing the benefits of using attorneys as agents); Jeffrey Z.
Rubin & Frank E. A. Sander, When Should We Use Agents? Direct vs. RepresentativeNegotiation, in
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 81, 81-87 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Rubin eds., 1991)
(describing the potential advantages and disadvantages of using agents in negotiation).
28. Thus, attorneys can help their clients avoid perceiving themselves as the victims of
comparative imbalance. According to the theory of relative deprivation, people care very much
about whether their results are at least comparable to those received by similarly-situated others.
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the effects of social and psychological influences. Indeed, lawyers' increasing
reliance upon mediators for second opinions suggests a certain awareness of
the difficulties created by the egocentric, availability, and other biases.2 9

III. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS PERCEPTIONS
A. Definition and Effects of ProceduralFairness
Procedural fairness is concerned with people's perceptions of the fairness
of the procedures or processes used to arrive at outcomes. 30 Researchers have
found that people's perceptions of procedural justice have profound effects. 3'
First, people who believe that they have been treated in a procedurally fair
manner are more likely to conclude that the resulting outcome is substantively
fair. 32 In effect, a person's perception of procedural fairness anchors general

The sense of being deprived occurs if there is a perceived discrepancy between what a
person obtains, of what she wants, and what she believes she is entitled to obtain. The
deprivation is relative because one's sense of deprivation is largely determined by past and
current comparisons with others as well as by future expectations.
Deutsch, supra note 2, at 44.
29. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-ConnectedMediation: What's Justice Got To
Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 807-09 (2001) (examining lawyers' preference for mediators
who engage in evaluative interventions).
30. See Deutsch, supra note 2, at 41.
31. See Welsh, supra note 29, at 817-20 (describing the effects of procedural justice).
32. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 66-70, 205 (1988). Lind and Tyler describe laboratory and field studies that show that
greater perceptions of procedural justice generally produce greater perceptions of distributive justice,
regardless of whether the outcome is positive or negative. Id. Occasional studies show that this effect
may be reduced when the outcome is positive, but also that this effect continues to be strong when
the outcome is negative. Id.; see also Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small
Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 11, 37 (1984)
[hereinafter McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court] (reporting a study that found
that fairness perceptions depend in part upon whether the dispute resolution forum operates under a
consent or command model and that "[d]efendants werc about twice as likely to perceive the
settlement as fair after consensual settlements"-reached in face-to-face mediation sessions generally
without iawyers-"as after adjudication"); Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims
Mediation in Maine: An EmpiricalAssessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 258 (1981) (reporting that the
perceived fairness of adjudicated outcomes "closely paralleled the degree of one's victory or loss,"
while perceived fairness of outcomes reached in face-to-face mediation sessions was much more
weakly correlated with the favorability of the outcome); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the
Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 850, 859 (1994) (reporting that studies in legal and managerial settings found that the
"primary relational issue influencing judgments of distributive justice was trustworthiness"); Tom R.
Tyler, The Psychology of ProceduralJustice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 834 (1989) (observing that people are most influenced by the relational
concern of neutrality "when the issue of concern is outcome fairness").
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Second, people who

believe that they were treated fairly in a dispute resolution or decision-making34
procedure are more likely to comply with the outcome of the procedure.

This effect will occur even if the outcomes are not favorable 35 or produce
unhappiness. 36 Last, people's perceptions of the procedural fairness provided
by a decision maker affect the respect and loyalty accorded to that decision
maker and the institution that sponsored the decision-making process.37 This
effect is particularly strong for the courts.38 Perhaps surprisingly, perceptions
of distributive justice generally have a much more modest impact 3 9 than
33. See E. Allan Lind, ProceduralJustice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, in
EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177, 185 [hereinafter Lind, ProceduralJustice,
Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities]. Lind writes:
[Pleople form their original justice judgment on the basis of procedures and social process
and then later incorporate outcome information into their overall impressions of the
fairness or unfairness of the encounter. In the terms of art used in modern social cognition
theory, process information anchors the fairness judgment to such an extent that outcome
information can only make relatively minor adjustments.
Id. This psychological shortcut "replaces a full exploration of the implications and possible motives
of each directive from an authority." Lind et al., Individualand CorporateDispute Resolution: Using
ProceduralFairnessas a Decision Heuristic,38 ADMIN. SCI. Q., 224, 225 (1993).
34. See Lind, ProceduralJustice, Disputing,and Reactions to Legal Authoirities, supra note
33, at 192 (describing research regarding court-annexed arbitration that found that "[a]cceptance of
the arbitration awards as resolution of the case was much more strongly linked to the fairness
judgments than to the outcome"). Moreover, one study of the resolution of cases in small claims
court found greater compliance with results reached in consensual processes than in adjudicative
processes, suggesting that "the personal and immediate commitments generated by consensual
processes bind people more strongly to compliance than the relatively distant, impersonal obligations
imposed by authorities." McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court, supra note 32, at
44-45. Compliance with mediated results (reached in face-to-face meetings without lawyers) was
higher than compliance with negotiated results. See id at 21; see also Tyler, supra note 32, at 857
(discussing field studies that found that "procedural justice is the primary justice judgment
influencing affect and the willingness to accept third-party decisions, although distributive influences
also occur").
35. See Tyler, supra note 32, at 857.
36. See Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 313,
324, 327 (1993) (reporting research showing that respondents who perceived that the mediation
process was fair were more likely to comply with the agreement, even though they were not
necessarily happier with the agreement).
37. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, at 209 (summarizing studies that have "found that
procedural justice judgments affect the evaluation of authorities and institutions"); TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 94-108 (1990) (finding that procedural fairness judgments influence
perceptions of the legitimacy of legal authority and that this effect is particularly strong for the
courts); Lind, ProceduralJustice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra note 33, at
188 (summarizing studies showing that perceptions of authorities' legitimacy and compliance "with
authoritative directives correlate highly with procedural fairness judgments").
38. TYLER, supra note 37, at 94-108.
39. LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, at 242. There may be a need to distinguish unsophisticated
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perceptions of procedural justice.
B. Criteriafor JudgingProceduralFairness

In contrast to the earlier discussion of competing criteria for judging
distributive fairness, researchers have discovered a striking consistency in the
criteria that people use to judge whether a dispute resolution or decision-

making process was fair. People in a variety of settings (e.g., workplace,
contacts with police, litigation) 40 and from different countries and cultures 4
agree on four process characteristics as significant in signaling procedural
42
fairness.
First, people are more likely to judge a process as fair if they are
given a meaningful opportunity to tell their story (i.e., an opportunity for
voice).43 Second, people care about the consideration that they receive from
the decision maker. 4 In other words, in a process that feels fair, people
individual disputants from sophisticated institutional litigants. See, e.g., JANE W. ADLER ET AL.,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: HOW LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 76, 83

(1983) (Unlike unsophisticated individual litigants, institutional litigants who made extensive use of
the arbitration program appeared to care little about "qualitative aspects of the hearing process. They
judge arbitration primarily on the basis of the outcomes it delivers."). In a field study, however,
researchers found that procedural justice judgments strongly influenced litigants' decisions whether
or not to accept nonbinding arbitration awards, regardless of whether litigants were individuals, small
business owners, or corporate officers; only corporate employees failed to demonstrate a link
between their procedural justice judgments and their decisions to accept awards. Lind et at., supra
note 33, at 247.
40. LIND & TYLER, supra note 32, at 211-12.
41. See, e.g., Stephen LaTour et al., Procedure: TransnationalPerspectives and Preferences,
86 YALE L.J. 258, 281 (1976) (finding that subjects in Chapel Hill and Hamburg both preferred
procedures allowing "full opportunity for evidence presentation," but diverged with respect to
third-party decision control; Chapel Hill subjects preferred that the third party control the outcome
while Hamburg subjects did not); E. Allan Lind et al., Reactions to Procedural Models for
Adjudicative Conflict Resolution: A Cross-National Study, 22 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 318, 335 (1978)
(reporting that in a laboratory study involving students in the United States, England, France, and
West Germany, researchers found that the subjects consistently preferred the adversary model over
the investigator and inquisitorial models, suggesting that "even among subjects whose own legal
systems are based on inquisitorial models," procedures that provide high control over voice are
preferred and perceived as more fair); see also E. Allan Lind et al., Procedural Context and Culture:
Variation in the Antecedents ofProceduralJusticeJudgments, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
767, 777 (1997)

(discussing twn laboratory studies involving fuur cultures, which indicate that

procedural fairness is defined consistently across cultures and primarily in terms of relational
variables); Leung & Morris, supra note 3, at 358-59 (noting that "available evidence suggests that the
same general principles determine people's perception [of procedural and interactional justice] across
culture").
42. See Welsh, supra note 29, at 820-26 (describing process characteristics that enhance
perceptions of procedural justice).
43. Lind, ProceduralJustice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra note 33, at
180.
44. Id. at 183; See Donald E. Conlon et al., Nonlinear and Nonmonotonic Effects of Outcome
on Procedural and Distributive Fairness Judgments, 19 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1085, 1095
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receive assurance that the decision maker has listened to them and understood
and cared about what they had to say. Third, people watch for signs that the
decision maker is trying to treat them in an even-handed and fair manner.4 5
Finally, people value a process that accords them dignity and respect.4 6
Most of the research that has been done regarding procedural justice has
focused on people's interactions with third-party authorities in dispute
resolution or decision making processes (e.g., judges, arbitrators, managers,
mediators). Recently, however, researchers have begun to examine the effect
of mediation participants' interactions with each other upon their procedural
fairness perceptions. In mediation, like negotiation, there will not be an
outcome unless the mediation participants themselves agree upon one. They,
rather than the third party authority, are the ultimate decision makers. These
recent studies have discovered that mediation participants' procedural fairness
perceptions are based very much upon the dynamics of their interaction with
each other.47 This research suggests that procedural fairness considerations
also are likely to apply to negotiation. Indeed, Tom Tyler has suggested that
(1989) ("suggest[ing] that it is not only important for disputants to express their opinions, but [that]
they must [also] feel that the third party is giving due consideration to the views expressed by the
disputants"); Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne M. Brett, Comparing Three Processes Underlying
Judgments of ProceduralJustice:A Field Study of Mediation and Arbitration, 65 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1167, 1173 (1993). The study measured third party fairness by asking grievants
whether the third party understood the grievance, whether the third party was fair, whether the third
party was impartial, whether the grievants were willing to take a future grievance to the same third
party, and whether the third party seriously considered their feelings and opinions. Id. at 1171.
45. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 39, at 65 (reporting that litigants simply want "an
opportunity to have their case heard and decided by an impartial third party"); Tyler, supra note 32,
at 853 (reporting that "neutrality" is one of three relational concerns that exert independent influence
on procedural justice judgments). Although "[n]eutrality involves honesty and lack of bias," people
focus "on whether the third party creates a 'level playing field' by evenhanded treatment... [and]
uses facts, not opinions," as bases for decision making. Id. at 854. Consequently, litigants value
trust in the motives of the third-party authority as the primary relational influence on procedural
justice; "issues of standing and neutrality [are] of lesser importance." Id.; see also Tom R. Tyler,
Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects in Judgments of ProceduralJustice: A Test of Four
Models, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 333, 337 (1987) (reporting that in field experiment a
significant "voice effect" occurred regardless of whether citizens viewed decision makers as
impartial or nonbiased; however, judgments of process control were affected by citizens' perceptions
that decision makers considered their views and tried to be fair).
46. See E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF

TRIALS, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 22-23 (1989);
E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in
the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 953, 958 (1990); Tyler, supra note 32, at 831.
Importantly, however, studies suggest that in high power distance cultures-in which hierarchy is
more likely to be accepted and those at the top are understood as entitled to more privilege and
deference-people are less likely than those in low power distance societies to perceive injustice
when a high-status in-group person engages in behavior that is not respectful and even insulting. See
Leung & Morris, supra note 3, at 361.
47. See Nabatchi & Bingham, supra note 24.
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the importance of dignified treatment parallels a finding in the negotiation
literature that "issues of 'face saving' often overwhelm bargainers, leading
them to make choices not in their economic self-interest. 48
C. Theories Explaining the Impact of ProceduralFairnessUpon Perceptions
of DistributiveFairness
The impact of procedural fairness perceptions upon distributive fairness is
so intriguing that this connection merits a bit more exploration. Two theories
help to explain this effect of procedural fairness. The first theory, which takes
an instrumentalist approach, urges that people value the opportunity for voice
because it permits them to influence the final outcome of dispute resolution or
decision-making processes. 49 Because they have been invited to express their
views, people can be more confident that the final decision will be fully
informed and substantively fair. This theory is quite rational, but it was
revealed as an incomplete explanation when researchers discovered that the
opportunity for voice led to perceptions of procedural justice even when
people knew that their views would not and could not influence the final
outcome.5 0 Scholars today theorize that perceptions of procedural fairness
actually represent a heuristic, or mental shortcut, for assessments of
distributive fairness.5"
48. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputants' Concerns in Mediation, 3 NEGOTIATION J.
367, 371 (1987).
49. See Lind, ProceduralJustice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra note 33,
at 179.
50. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et at., Voice, Control, and ProceduralJustice: Instrumental and
Noninstrumental Concerns in FairnessJudgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 957
(1990) (finding that people's fairness judgments are enhanced by the opportunity to voice their
opinions even when this opportunity does not occur until after a decision has been made; having a
"voice with the possibility of influence ... leads to even greater perceived fairness"); Tom R. Tyler
et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of ProcessControl, 48
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 80 (1985) (based on one field study and two laboratory
studies, researchers concluded that voice heightens procedural justice judgments and leadership
endorsement even when disputants perceive that they have little control over the decision); see also
Lind & Tyler, supra note 32, at 215. Some studies reveal that variations in decision control either
have no influence on satisfaction or iudgment of procedural i1-tice or have a smaller ;"..ence than
the effects of control over voice. Id Growing evidence suggests that control over the process or
having a voice "enhances judgments of procedural fairness because it is instrumental in assuring fair
outcomes." Id. It is important to point out, however, that disputants' perceptions of procedural
justice are affected by whether or not they perceive that the decision maker has considered what they
said. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. In addition, studies have found that under certain
conditions, voice without decision control heightens feelings of procedural injustice and
dissatisfaction with leaders, a result described as the "frustration effect." See Tom R. Tyler et al.,
supra, at 74.
51. See Lind, ProceduralJustice, Disputing,and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra note 33,
at 177, 185.
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Researchers also have found empirical support for a second theory, called
the group value theory, which provides that procedures themselves
communicate whether people are viewed as valuable members of the relevant
group. 52 The opportunity for voice, consideration, and dignified, even-handed
treatment send powerful messages to people regarding their social status,
53
which then "validates their self-identity, self-esteem, and self-respect.,
Recognition as a member of the favored "in-group" suggests other benefits as
well. If people can infer that the decision maker is "trustworthy and
benevolently disposed" 54 toward them, "they can trust that in the long run
the
55
authority with whom they are dealing will work to serve their interests.,
In the absence of a pre-existing and positive relationship, a negotiator is
likely to be somewhat cautious to ascribe benevolent intentions to the other,
presumably self-interested negotiator. In addition, people are quite alert for
signs that an apparently just process is, in actuality, a sham.56 Nonetheless,
the procedural justice literature suggests that negotiators' interactions with
each other within the negotiation itself can influence their perceptions of both
procedural and distributive fairness.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Lawyers and clients rely upon their assessments of fairness to make all
sorts of decisions during negotiation: What offer shall we make? How should
we respond to the other side's demand? Should we settle or make a counteroffer? Is the other side being so ridiculous that it is time to call an impasse?
Each one of these questions requires consideration of fairness, and it
should now be quite clear that fairness is largely a matter of perception.
Perhaps what is most interesting about the research that has been done
regarding fairness perceptions is the extent to which it undermines the iconic
image of two rational negotiators locked in a battle of logic, economics, and
will. Rather, the research reveals that negotiators' aspirations and moves will
be significantly influenced by the culture and context within which they are
52. Id. at 182.
53. Tyler, supra note 32, at 852.
54. Lind, ProceduralJustice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra note 33, at
182.
55. Tyler, supra note 32, at 854.
56. According to the procedural justice literature, citizens are aware of their vulnerability to
intentional and unintentional manipulation and, if they perceive any evidence of unfair treatment or
perceive "false representations of fair treatment," they respond with "extremely negative reactions."
Lind, ProceduralJustice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra note 33, at 187; see
Tyler et al., supra note 50, at 74 (explaining that under certain conditions, voice without decision
control heightens feelings of procedural injustice and dissatisfaction with leaders, a result described
as the "frustration effect").
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negotiating, their own self-interest, and most intriguing of all, their sense of
connection to each other. Ironically, as negotiations become increasingly
global and virtual, it 57
is the development of those old-fashioned relationships
that may matter most.

57. Thompson & Nadler, supra note 17, at 228-29 (describing the effectiveness of relationshipbuilding-or "schmoozing"-in email negotiation).

